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INTRODUCTION
The UGA does not want this Court to reach the merits of the City's
arguments, and it offers various unpersuasive procedural reasons to deflect the Court's
attention. This Court should reach the merits, because the UGA asks for enforcement of
an agreement whereby it claims it was entitled to receive from the City for free a parcel
of property valued at about $160,000. Cases from this Court, however, make such an
agreement with a municipality invalid. The UGA has already received more value than it
paid for, and this Court should not overrule settled legal principles established to protect
public assets. Yet, even if the agreement were valid, the express condition precedent
contained in the agreement for requiring the transfer of the property never occurred.
Thus, the City did not breach the agreement. The district court should be reversed.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY AND THE UGA IS
ULTRA VIRES AND UNENFORCEABLE
A.

The Agreement Lacks The Required Consideration For
Transfer of Municipal Assets

Under Utah law, the type of consideration required for the transfer of
public property is not the typical "bargained for exchange" that is required in contracts
generally; instead, the consideration must be a specific, "present benefit that reflects the
fair market value." Municipal Bldg. Auth. v. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273, 282 (Utah 1985);
see Sears v. Ogden City, 533 P.2d 118, 119 (Utah 1975); Salt Lake County Comm n v.
Salt Lake County Attorney, 1999 UT 73 If 31, 985 P.2d 899, 910 (Utah 1999). The UGA
1

attempts to distinguish Sears, Lowder, and Salt Lake County Commission by arguing that
those cases involved "outright gifts," Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 26
(hereinafter "Answer Brief), while here, the City received consideration in the form of
the UGA's willingness to leave its prior offices and move its operations to the new club
house. Answer Brief at 21-22, 25. The UGA misstates the facts of Sears, Lowder, and
Salt Lake County Commission, and a willingness to move offices does not come close to
the kind of consideration those cases required.
In Sears, this Court held that a city is not authorized under Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-8-2 to dispose of its real property by gift. Sears, 533 P.2d at 119. Whether a
proposed transfer constitutes an illegal gift is not based simply on whether there was any
consideration at all, but on whether the transfer was "for an adequate consideration."
Sears, 533 P.2d at 199 (emphasis added).
In Lowder, this Court built on the principles of Sears and concluded that,
like municipalities, counties also hold public property "in trust for the use and benefit of
the constituents of the owning entity" and thus can dispose of county property only for
adequate consideration. Lowder, 711 P.2d at 282 (citing Sears and finding Utah Code
Ann. § 10-8-2 analogous to Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-4-3, 17-5-481). Again, this Court's
analysis centered not on whether there was any consideration at all for the proposed
transfer, but on whether the consideration was a "present benefit that reflects the fair
market value" of the property to be transferred. Lowder, 711 P.2d at 282. This Court

1

Section 17-5-48 is now codified as Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-242.
2

held that the use of a new jail facility and the ability to reacquire the site in 20 years was
"a speculative and future benefit that cannot suffice to validate a present transfer of the
fee." Id.
In Salt Lake County Commission, this Court extended the principles of
Sears and Lowder to include transfers of money as well as real property. Salt Lake
County Comm 'n, 1999 UT 73 \ 31, 985 P.2d at 910 (citing Sears and Lowder), Again,
the analysis focused not on whether there was any consideration at all, but on whether
there was "adequate consideration," meaning a "present benefit that reflects the fair
market value." Id. The Court held that "a general finding . . . [of] a benefit, without
specifying exactly what that benefit is, in present market value terms, is not specific
enough to qualify the benefit as adequate consideration." Id.
Thus, under the principles of Sears, Lowder, and Salt Lake County
Commission, the mere existence of some oblique benefit to the municipality is not
sufficient to validate a proposed transfer of public property. The UGA argues that
because the "agreement is a complete package and cannot be divided into two parts that
are distinct from each other," Answer Brief at 21, this Court should find that the
consideration for the promised conveyance of the UGA property was the UGA's
willingness to leave its current offices and move its operations to the new club house.
See Answer Brief at 21-22, 25. Whether the lease and the promise regarding the UGA
Property are viewed as separate agreements or as a "complete package," however, the

3

result is the same. Either way, no adequate consideration was provided, anywhere, for
the UGA Property.2
While the UGA may be "the oldest and largest organization of amateur
golfers in the state of Utah and Utah's representative with the United States Golf
Association," and while it may indeed have been a "tremendous undertaking" for it to
move, Answer Brief at 21,25, this type of general and unquantifiable benefit is
insufficient to validate the transfer of public property. The Agreement proposed to
transfer the UGA Property "at no cost to User," R. 27«[[ 4, and even assuming the UGA's
move provided some general benefit to the City, there is no evidence, or even an
assertion, that this move provided a specific and quantifiable present benefit that
reflected the fair market value of the UGA Property. See Lowder, 111 P.2d at 282; Salt
Lake County Comm % 1999 UT 73 % 31, 985 P.2d at 910.
There was simply no consideration of the type required by Sears, Lowder,
and Salt Lake County Commission for the transfer of the UGA Property.3 The
2

By analogy, if the agreement were for the simple transfer of two parcels of City
property, Sears and Lowder would clearly require "adequate consideration" for each
parcel. In essence, that is what happened here because the Agreement included the
transfer of the leasehold interest in the office space for the payment of rent, and the
potential transfer of the UGA Property or its sale proceeds. Thus, consideration would
be required for each transfer, but no consideration was contemplated for the latter.
3

Even the rent paid by the UGA for the office space was not adequate
consideration for the proposed transfer of the UGA property. The rental payments
represented at most the lease value of the office space and could not have simultaneously
represented the value of the UGA Property. In fact, the UGA's lease payments under the
Agreement were below the fair market value of the office space leased. See Appellants'
Brief at 20-21. Similarly, any payments the UGA would have made under an extended
20-year lease also would have represented the rental value of the office space in the club
4

Agreement to transfer the UGA Property or its sale proceeds is, therefore, outside the
scope of the City's powers and is ultra vires and unenforceable. See McQuillan, The
Law of Municipal Corporations § 29.91 (3d ed. 1999). Without an enforceable
agreement, the City can have no liability, and the UGA can recover no damages. The
ruling of the district court should be reversed.4
B.

The Municipal Building Authority Could Not Convey Title to
The UGA

The Agreement between the UGA and the City is also ultra vires and
unenforceable because the Agreement purports to obligate the Municipal Building
Authority to transfer the UGA Property to the UGA, and the Municipal Building
Authority has no authority to do so. Although Utah's Municipal Building Authority Act
authorizes municipal building authorities to "acquire, improve, or extend one or more
projects and to finance their costs on behalf of the public body that created [them],"

house and not the value of the UGA Property. See Appellants' Brief at 22-23.
4

In addition to attempting to distinguish the Sears line of cases, the UGA
asks this Court to reject the fundamental principles recognized in Sears, Lowder, and Salt
Lake County Commission by arguing that no more consideration is required here than is
required generally to support agreements between private parties. Answer Brief at 26-27.
In support of its argument, the UGA cites Healthcare Servs. Group, Inc. v. Utah Dept. of
Health, 40 P.3d 591 (Utah 2002). The reasoning of Healthcare Servs. is inapplicable
here, however, because its analysis focuses on Utah Constitution art. VI section 29,
rather than Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-2 or other analogous provisions. See Lowder, 711
P.2d at 282 (finding Utah Code Ann. § 17-4-3 and 17-5-48 analogous to § 10-8-2).
Section 10-8-2 governs the disposal of municipal property, and this provision has been
clearly and unequivocally interpreted by this Court to require that municipal property be
transferred for nothing less than "adequate consideration." Sears, 533 P.2d at 119.
Moreover, Healthcare Servs. involved an agreement between a private party and a state
agency, not a municipality, for the provision of services, not the transfer of public
property. Thus, it is a very different kind of case.
5

municipal building authorities are not empowered to dispose of property to anyone other
than the public body that created them. See Appellants' Brief at 24; Utah Code Ann.
§ 17A-3-903(l),(2).
Despite the clear limitations of Utah's Act, the UGA argues that the
Agreement is nevertheless enforceable because the Municipal Building Authority never
actually owned the property and the City never intended that the UGA Property be a part
of the golf course project. Answer Brief at 28. Whether the Agreement was factually
feasible is irrelevant, however, because on its face, the Agreement purports to obligate
the Municipal Building Authority to do something that it has no authority to do-convey
the UGA Property to the UGA. R. 27 Tflj B, F; R. 32ffl[C, I. Moreover, the Municipal
Building Authority has authority only to deal with property that is part of a "project" as
defined by the Act. If the UGA Property is not part of a project, as the UGA argues, then
by definition the Municipal Building Authority did not have power to deal with it and
could not have transferred it.
C.

The City is Obligated to Challenge the Enforceability of the
Agreement Concerning the UGA Property.

A "municipal corporation cannot in any manner bind itself by any contract
which is beyond the scope of its powers," and "[w]hen a municipality goes beyond the
law, the person who deals with it in doing so does so at his or her own risk." McQuillan,
The Law of Municipal Corporations § 29.04 (3d ed. 1999) (emphasis added); see
Thatcher Chem. Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 21 Utah 2d 355, 358, 445 P.2d 769, 771
(Utah 1968). The UGA argues, however, that the City must honor the terms of the
6

Agreement, regardless of whether it is ultra vires, because the Agreement "is a detailed
written agreement that was negotiated," and because the City itself should not be allowed
to challenge the enforceability of the Agreement. Answer Brief at 22-23.
The UGA misses the point. Because a city cannot bind itself "in any
manner" by an ultra vires contract, the issue is not whether the contract was carefully
negotiated or who is challenging its enforceability, but how best to protect the public's
assets entrusted to the City. To this end, "[i]t is better that the innocent contracting party
suffer from the municipality's mistakes than to adopt rules, which, through improper
combination or collusion, could be detrimental or injurious to the public." McQuillan,
The Law of Municipal Corporations § 29.04 (3d ed. 1999).
It is important to remember, however, that the UGA will not suffer at all if
the Court reverses the district court's decision. The UGA paid less than $120,000 for six
years' use of office space at the club house that the parties agreed was worth more than
$ 150,000. See Appellants' Brief at 21. Thus, the UGA has already received more than
full value for what it paid. Under the law, it is not entitled to more.

7

II.

EVEN ASSUMING THE AGREEMENT IS ENFORCEABLE, THE
CITY DID NOT BREACH ANY PROVISIONS OF THE
AGREEMENT
A.

Any Defects on the Title Were Irrelevant Because the UGA was
Only Entitled to the Sale Proceeds

Under the clear terms of the Agreement, the UGA was entitled to
conveyance of the title to the UGA Property only if it first elected to construct its
headquarters and the Utah Golf Hall of Fame on the Property and had its plans approved
by the City. R. 34 If 6. Because the UGA had decided not to build on the UGA Property,
it was instead entitled only to the proceeds from the sale of the property (and then only if
it first agreed to a 20-year lease). R. 34 ^f 7(a). Thus, any defects on the title to the UGA
Property were irrelevant since the UGA was only entitled to the sale proceeds, or, in
other words, the value of the property. The district court should not have found that
defects on the title resulted in a breach.
B.

Any Defects on the Title Were Irrelevant Because Performance
Was Not Due and the Defects Were Not Irremediable

According to the UGA, because it "stood ready to perform its part of the
Agreement and enter into a 20 year lease extension," the time for performance had
arrived and the City was obligated to perform by conveying clear title to the UGA
Property. Answer Brief at 30-32. Merely "standing ready to perform" is not the same as
performing, however, and until the UGA actually satisfied the condition precedent, the
City was under no obligation whatsoever to perform by clearing the defect or conveying
title. Where "performance by the plaintiff is a condition precedent to his right to demand

8

performance of the defendant, such performance must be averred" to sue on the contract,
and an allegation that the plaintiff was "ready and willing" to perform is not equivalent to
an averment of performance.5 Brooks v. Scoville, 81 Utah 163, 17 P.2d 218, 220-221
(1932).
Here, the UGA had no right to sue for performance of the Agreement until
the condition precedent had been satisfied. The UGA refused to enter into a 20-year
lease with the City, however, causing a failure of the condition precedent. Thus, the time
for the City's performance had not arrived.
Because the time for performance had not yet arrived, any defect on the
title could not have constituted an anticipatory breach unless the defect was irremediable.
See Appellants' Brief at 29-30 (citing cases). The UGA never argued and does not now
argue, and the district court made no finding, that the defect was irremediable. The UGA
simply argued, and the district court found, that the defect had not been cured at the time
the UGA demanded performance. R. 222-223; R. 528 % 14. At the very least, the district
court should be reversed and the case remanded for a determination of whether the
defects were irremediable. By mistakenly focusing on whether the defect had been
cured, rather than whether the defect could be cured, the district court prematurely and
incorrectly concluded that the City had anticipatorily breached the Agreement. In fact,
5

The only time being "ready and willing" to perform a condition precedent
is sufficient is when the other party has anticipatorily breached the contract. See R. 224;
Brooks v. Scoville, 81 Utah 163, 17 P.2d 218, 220, 221 (1932); see also Hidalgo
Properties, Inc. v. Wachovia Mtg. Co., 617 F.2d 196, 199 (10th Cir. 1980). "Ready and
willing" cannot be used, however, to support the argument that the condition precedent
has been actually satisfied and thus the time for performance has arrived.
9

the use restriction complained of by the UGA could have been removed by the City.
R. 321 T[ 6. Because the time for performance had not arrived and the defect was not
irremediable, there was no breach. The ruling of the district court should be reversed.
III.

THE CONDITION PRECEDENT IN THE SECOND ADDENDUM
WAS NOT AN UNENFORCEABLE AGREEMENT TO AGREE
Because the district court improperly concluded that the City had

anticipatorily breached the Agreement by not immediately perfecting the title to the UGA
Property, it excused the UGA's actual performance of any of the condition precedents.
The district court looked next to whether the UGA had at least been "ready and willing"
to perform a condition precedent, and concluded that the 20-year lease condition
precedent in the Second Addendum was an unenforceable agreement to agree. R. 224.
This conclusion was wrong.
The UGA relies on Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., the same
case relied upon by the district court. Answer Brief at 36 (citing also Cottonwood Mall
Co. v. Sine, and Browns Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch). The UGA, however, completely ignores
the crucial distinction between the Pingree line of cases and the facts of this case. In
those cases, the lease provision at issue was a covenant promising an indefinite option to
renew. Here, on the other hand, the provision is simply a condition precedent, and
conditions precedent are entirely different from covenants.
While covenants determine what must be performed to discharge duties,
conditions simply determine when and if the duties defined in the covenants must be
performed. Because of their unique nature, conditions precedent are not required to be
10

explicitly based on wholly objective criteria or to be enforceable agreements in their own
right. In fact, a condition precedent may be based solely on one's personal satisfaction
with the quality of the performance for which he has bargained. 3 A Arthur L. Corbin,
Corbin on Contracts § 644 at 78-79 (1960).
The UGA responds that the 20-year lease provision in the Second
Addendum is not a "satisfaction" requirement, and that it actually reserves to the City a
unilateral right of termination that makes it unenforceable. That is not true, and the case
cited by the UGA in support of its argument is easily distinguished from this case. See
Answer Brief at 37 (citing Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co.,
706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985)).
In Resource Management, the parties negotiated a contract for oil and gas
royalties in which the company expressly reserved the right to terminate the contract "in
its sole discretion" upon the occurrence of a certain condition subsequent, which was if
the company determined that there was not sufficient promise of minerals of commercial
value on the property. Resource Management, 706 P.2d at 1034. Here, however, there
was no express right of termination of any kind, and any implied right of termination
could have been used by either party. Both the UGA and the City had to agree to terms
of a 20-year lease, and thus both had the same opportunity to cause a failure of the
condition precedent. Therefore, the analysis of Resource Management does not support
the UGA's argument.

11

Resource Management does support the City's position, however, in
another respect. In Resource Management, this Court held that even the express right of
termination in that case did not grant the company an unqualified, unilateral right of
termination because the right to terminate the contract only arose upon a determination
that there was not sufficient promise of minerals of commercial value. This Court
concluded that if "one party reserves the right to terminate a contract upon the
occurrence of a condition subsequent, the contract is not unenforceable ab initio for lack
of mutuality of consideration." 706 P.2d at 1037. Even though the determination as to
whether there was sufficient promise of minerals of commercials value was to be made in
the company's "sole discretion," that did not confer an arbitrary power on the company
because the "law generally imposes a duty to perform contractual obligations in good
faith." Id.
In other words, while courts do endeavor to construe contracts so that one
party does not have a unilateral right of termination, see Answer Brief at 37, they do so
not by finding the contract provision unenforceable, as the district court did here, but by
finding, if possible, an implied covenant to act in good faith. See Resource Management,
706 P.2d at 1037-1038; see also Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d
1317, 1321 (Utah 1976) (discussing cases which uphold lease options with undetermined
terms by implying a mutual agreement for a reasonable rental). Here, the district court
found an implied covenant to negotiate an extended 20-year lease in good faith, which
limited the City's right to avoid the occurrence of the condition precedent by requiring

12

that the City not act capriciously or in bad faith.6 R. 441. As a result, the City did not
have an arbitrary, unfettered right to unilaterally avoid the occurrence of the condition
precedent contained in the Second Addendum, and it was a valid condition precedent.
Public policy supports this conclusion. Contrary to the UGA's assertions,
upholding the 20-year lease provision in the Second Addendum would not require this
court to determine a specific dollar amount for the 20-year lease provision. Answer Brief
at 37-38. As explained previously, because the provision was a condition precedent and
not a covenant, the district court simply needed to look to see if an extended lease
agreement had been made. See Appellants' Brief at 35-36. The ruling of the district
court should be reversed.
IV.

THE UGA ALSO FAILED TO SATISFY THE CONDITION
PRECEDENT OF THE FIRST ADDENDUM
Because it concluded the condition precedent in the Second Addendum

was an unenforceable agreement to agree, the district court looked to the condition
precedent in the First Addendum and found that the UGA had at least been "ready and
willing" to perform under those terms. R. 224. This finding, however, was in error.

6

Of course, the UGA also would have been required to negotiate a new 20-year
lease in good faith. Where title to the UGA Property was itself irrelevant to the terms of
a new 20-year office lease, and where the district court found that the UGA did not
mitigate its damages by refusing to negotiate a 20-year lease despite the defects on the
title to the UGA Property, R. 443-45, that is tantamount to a finding that the UGA did
not negotiate in good faith. Thus, the UGA itself caused the failure of the condition
precedent by breaching its own obligation under the Agreement to negotiate in good
faith. It should not be allowed to collect damages for its own breach.
13

The UGA argues that it satisfied the condition precedent in the First
Addendum because it "was ready and willing to sign a 20-year lease extension" before
the expiration of the original term of the lease. Answer Brief at 39. The UGA, however,
did not make an offer meeting the terms of the First Addendum until December 8, 1999,
almost a full year after the original term of the lease had expired, and the day after the
City had voted to discontinue negotiations and prepare an eviction notice. R. 148;
R. 150-151. If the provision from the First Addendum is considered to be an option to
extend as the district court apparently believed it was, Utah law is clear that option
provisions must be strictly complied with. See Appellants' Brief at 37-38. The UGA did
not strictly comply with the terms of the option provision in the First Addendum, nor was
it ready and willing to do so. At the very least, an issue of fact exists on this point that
would preclude summary judgment. The ruling of the district court should be reversed.7

7

The UGA argues that this issue is raised for the first time on appeal.
Answer Brief at 39. To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, the key is whether the
court was provided with "an opportunity to rule on the issue's merits." West One Bank,
Utah v. Life Ins, Co., 887 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Here, the City is arguing
that the UGA never actually complied with, and never evidenced a willingness to comply
with, the clear terms of the option provision in the First Addendum. The district court
ruled on this issue when it expressly held that the UGA had been ready and willing to
perform under those terms. See R. 224.
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V.

THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HAVE RECONSIDERED ITS
GRANT OF PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR THE UGA
The district court should have reconsidered its prior grant of partial

summary judgment and it erred by refusing to do so.8 The UGA argues that the Motion
for Reconsideration was untimely. The prior partial summary judgment ruling on
liability did not dispose of the whole case, however, and the City's Motion for
Reconsideration was filed before the end of discovery and before the district court had
set a trial date. R. 253-255; 389-390. Under these circumstances there could have been
no prejudice to the UGA. The Motion for Reconsideration was timely.
The UGA next argues that the Motion for Reconsideration was improper
because it raised two defenses that were allegedly waived because they were not raised in
the City's Answer9: (1) the Agreement was ultra vires because of no adequate
8

The UGA asserts that the district court's decision not to reconsider its grant
of partial summary judgment should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. Answer Brief
at 9. While the ultimate decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is
reviewed for abuse of discretion, the initial decision to consider such a motion is
reviewed for correctness. Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310, 1312
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). Here, because the district court refused to consider the City's
Motion for Reconsideration, its ruling is reviewed de novo. R. 424.
9

It is not even clear that the issue of whether the time for the City's
performance had arrived is an affirmative defense. A Rule 8(c) affirmative defense is a
defense employed to defeat a plaintiffs claim by raising matters outside or extrinsic to
the plaintiffs prima facie case. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923
P.2d 1366, 1374 (Utah 1996); see also Creekview Apartments v. State Farm Ins. Co.,
Ill P.2d 693, 695 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (explaining that an avoidance under Rule 8(c) is
"a defense independent of the allegations in the pleadings"). In other words, a defense
that directly assails or "merely controverts [a] plaintiffs prima facie case is negative in
character"and is not an affirmative defense. Jones, Waldo, 923 P.2d at 1374. The UGA
asserts that the City breached the Agreement because the time for performance had
arrived, and the City argues that the clear terms of the Agreement itself prove otherwise.
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consideration, and (2) there was no breach because the time for the City's performance
had not yet arrived and the title defect was not irremediable. Answer Brief at 8,17,19.
These issues were raised in the City's Answer, however. In its Ninth Defense, the City
asserted that the UGA's claims were barred by a failure of legal consideration. R. 96-97
THf 57-58. This certainly covers the City's argument that the Agreement was ultra vires
because of no adequate consideration. And, in its Fourth and Seventh Defenses, the City
asserted that the UGA had breached and failed to comply with the terms and conditions
of the Agreement, and that the UGA's claims were barred by a failure of conditions
precedent. R. 95, 96fflf47-48, 53-54; see also R. 941f 34. Because the UGA failed to
satisfy the condition precedent, the time for the City's performance had not yet arrived.
The fact that the defect in title was not irremediable is a natural extension of this defense,
because it only further shows that the UGA's performance of the condition precedent
was not excused. These defenses were not waived.10

Thus, this defense controverts the UGA's case, and it is not an affirmative defense
subject to waiver.
10

Even assuming these are affirmative defenses which were not raised in the
City's Answer, affirmative defenses are not automatically waived by failure to raise them
in an answer. Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnel Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 58
(Utah 1986). In fact, affirmative defenses may be raised by a motion for summary
judgment. Smith v. Spain, 1998 WL 4358, *1 (10th Cir. Jan. 8, 1998); Camarillo v.
McCarthy, 998 F.2d 638, 639 (9th Cir. 1993) (cited with approval in Ring v. Lexington
Apartments & Motor Inns-Oklahoma, 3 Fed. Appx. 847, 851, 2001 WL 95144, *3
(10th Cir. 2001)); United States v. Alaska, 197 F. Supp. 834, 836 (D. Alaska 1961). In its
discretion, the court may also treat the motion for summary judgment as a motion to
amend. See, e.g. McGuinness v. University of New Mexico Sch. of Med., 170 F.3d 974,
979 (10th Cir. 1998); Evans v. McDonald's Corp., 936 F.2d 1087, 1090-1091 (10th Cir.
1991).
In determining whether affirmative defenses are timely raised in a motion other
16

The district court should have considered these legal arguments because
they presented the matter to the district court in a "different light," and because they
presented controlling Utah law that would have materially affected the outcome of this
case. Had the district court given proper consideration to these issues, the outcome
would have been different; therefore, a manifest injustice resulted when the court refused
to reconsider its prior ruling. See Trembly, 884 P.2d at 1311 (reciting factors a court can
consider in determining the propriety of reconsidering a prior ruling, including whether a
manifest injustice will result if the court does not reconsider its prior ruling, whether the
matter is presented in a different light, and whether the court needs to corrects its own
errors).
Finally, the UGA argues that the new evidence presented in the City's
Motion for Reconsideration was irrelevant. Answer Brief at 17-18. To the contrary,
however, the affidavit offered by the City went directly to the issue of whether the defect

than an answer, the court should consider whether the plaintiff had notice of the defense
and adequate time to respond. See Ring v. Lexington Apartments & Motor InnsOklahoma, 3 Fed. Appx. 847, 851, 2001 WL 95144, *3 (10th Cir. Feb. 5, 2001),
Camarillo, 998 F.2d at 639; 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1271.
Here, the UGA had notice of these legal arguments and an opportunity to respond, and it
has not even made an allegation of prejudice. As a result, even if the City failed to raise
these issues in its Answer or in the first partial summary judgment proceeding, these
issues may still be properly addressed in its Motion for Reconsideration and Summary
Judgment. See Entrup v. Colorado, 1994 WL 396048, *3 (10th Cir. July 29, 1994)
(stating that where an affirmative defense was not raised in an answer, motion to dismiss,
or summary judgment, the problem may have been cured through a subsequent motion
for reconsideration). In the final analysis, "where the substantive rights of the parties are
not endangered, the manner of raising the defense is unimportant." Alaska, 197 F. Supp.
at 836.
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on the title to the UGA Property was irremediable, and thus whether there could have
been any anticipatory breach of the Agreement. R. 321 ^f 6. New evidence is one of the
factors to be considered by a court in determining the propriety of reconsidering a prior
ruling, see Trembly, 884 P.2d at 1311, and the district court here should have accepted
this evidence and reconsidered its prior grant of partial summary judgment in light of the
long-settled law on the issue. Instead, the district court granted the UGA's Motion to
Strike and refused to consider this crucial and material evidence. R. 422. The ruling of
the district court should be reversed.
VI.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CALCULATING THE UGA'S
BENEFIT-OF-THE-BARGAIN DAMAGES
The UGA argues that it had the right to "sue for the loss of its expectation

of receiving the building lot," and that the "measure of damages for this loss was the fair
market value of the lot," with nothing deducted. Answer Brief at 40. An essential step
in calculating benefit-of-the-bargain damages, however, is to deduct from the value the
non-breaching party would have received from performance of the contract the costs that
party would have incurred in performing the contract. See Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d
143, 150-151 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 347. By
deducting nothing from the value of the UGA Property when awarding damages, R. 446,
the district court either erred in calculating damages or recognized that the Agreement
provided no consideration of the type required by Sears, Lowder, and Salt Lake County
Comm 'n, for the UGA Property. Either its ruling should be reversed pursuant to these
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cases, or the case should be remanded to the district court to deduct the costs the UGA
would have incurred by performing.11
VII.

IF THE CITY PREVAILS, THE COURT SHOULD AWARD IT
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
The Use Agreement provides for attorney fees and costs to the prevailing

party in litigation. R. 20. The district court awarded attorney fees and costs to the UGA.
R. 550. If the City prevails on this appeal, it requests attorney fees and costs incurred on
this appeal and in the district court. In that case, this Court should remand the case to the
district court for a calculation of attorney fees and costs. The UGA did not address this
issue in its Answer Brief.
VIII.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
AWARD THE UGA MOVING EXPENSES
The UGA cross-appeals, arguing that the district court erred in declining to

award the UGA its costs of moving. Answer Brief at 41-44. The district court denied
the UGA its moving expenses because it found the UGA had a duty to mitigate its
damages by agreeing to a 20-year lease and then independently pursuing its rights
regarding the UGA Property. R. 443-445. The UGA now argues that it had no duty to
mitigate its damages because the City could have mitigated damages for it by clearing
title and by not evicting the UGA in the first place. Answer Brief at 43. This argument
1l

The most likely possible cost the UGA avoided by not having to perform
was the present value of the amounts the UGA would have paid the City over the life of a
20-year lease. Agreeing to a 20-year lease was the only thing the UGA was supposed to
do to get the proceeds from the UGA Property. (Yet, as discussed above, the payments
made under a 20-year lease would have been consideration only for the office space and
not for the UGA Property.)
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makes no sense, because it is the plaintiff, and not the breaching party, who has a duty to
mitigate damages under the doctrine of avoidable consequences.12 See Mahmood v.
Ross, 1999 UT 104 % 31, 990 P.2d 933, 940 (Utah 1999); Pratt v. Board ofEduc, 564
P.2d 294, 298 (Utah 1977).
The UGA claims the City breached the Agreement long before the City
evicted the UGA and before the parties even started negotiations on a 20-year lease. The
evidence was undisputed that the City would have allowed the UGA to remain in the
club house space and that the UGA did not have to move. R. 565 at 83-85, 125. The
City only evicted the UGA because the UGA refused to negotiate a lease that did not
include a transfer of the UGA Property free of any restrictions. See Answer Brief at 14,
31,33. Thus, the district court's ruling that the UGA failed to properly mitigate its
damages is the only logical and reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts.
The UGA also argues that mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense,
and because it was not raised in the City's Answer, the district court had no right to
consider it. Answer Brief at 44. This argument is also without merit. The UGA made
no objection to the assertion of the defense at trial and it allowed the issue to be tried.
See R. 565. "[B]y not objecting, the [UGA], in turn, waived this defective mode of

12

The case cited by the UGA in support of its argument, Alexander v. Brown,
646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1982), simply states that where there was equal opportunity for
performance, a breaching party should not be heard to complain about the other party's
failure to perform. Here, however, the question is not whether the UGA performed its
obligations under the contract - the question is whether, after a breach had allegedly
occurred, the UGA fulfilled its duty under the doctrine of avoidable consequences to
mitigate its damages.
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placing the [defense] in issue." Golding v. Ashley Central Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 897,
899-900 (Utah 1990). "When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been
raised in the pleadings." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b); see Zions First Nat 7 Bank v. Rocky
Mountain Irrigation, Inc., 795 P.2d 658, 663 (Utah 1990). The district court correctly
concluded that the UGA failed to mitigate its damages.
IX.

THE CITY DID NOT BREACH ANY IMPLIED COVENANT OF
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
Finally, the UGA argues that this Court could uphold the decision of the

district court based upon the doctrine of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Answer Brief at 44-45. Specifically, the UGA argues that by not immediately
perfecting the title to the UGA Property at the UGA's demand, the City acted
unreasonably and violated the implied covenant. Answer Brief at 44. In the alternative,
the UGA argues the City should have just paid the fair market value of the property to
the UGA. Answer Brief at 44-45. As explained in detail above, however, the City did
not act unreasonably by not immediately perfecting title because a seller is not required to
perfect title until the time for performance has arrived, and here the time for the City's
performance had not yet arrived.
The UGA also asserts that the City acted unreasonably by suggesting that
the UGA enter into the 20 year lease and then work with the developer to resolve the use
restriction on the deed. Answer Brief at 45. Although the City did advise the UGA of
the desirability of this option, see R. 565 at 94, 131, this was by no means the City's only
21

or final position. The City also attempted to negotiate the value of the UGA Property
directly into the UGA's new 20 year lease. See R. 565 at 92; Appellants' Brief at 28-29.
Furthermore, this suggestion by the City is very similar to what the district court said the
UGA should have done to mitigate its damages—enter into a 20-year lease and resolve
the property issue later.
Thus, it was the UGA, and not the City, that acted unreasonably by
prematurely demanding the defect be cleared. Although the UGA knew its rights under
the Agreement were subject to a condition precedent, and that as a result, "[i]n order to
obtain the lot, the UGA had to [first] sign a 20 year extension of the lease," Answer Brief
at 10, the UGA admits that it nevertheless repeatedly refused to enter into a new lease
and demanded the City cure title. See Answer Brief at 14 ("The UGA required North
Salt Lake to be able to convey the lot free and clear from the use restrictions before
entering into a new lease.") (emphasis added); see also Answer Brief at 31, 33. Thus, the
UGA, and not the City, acted unreasonably and violated the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. The district court found as much when it concluded that the UGA
had failed to mitigate its damages by entering into a 20-year lease regardless of the
defects on title. Had the UGA properly, and in good faith, negotiated a 20-year lease
agreement, it is doubtful the parties would now be before this Court.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the City asks that this Court reverse the district
court's judgment and the rulings underlying that judgment. If the Court, however, agrees
with the district court that the Agreement included "adequate consideration" and that the
City breached the Agreement, the Court should remand to the district court for a
recalculation of damages. The Court should also deny the UGA's cross-appeal regarding
the mitigation of damages. If the City prevails on this appeal, it requests attorney fees
and costs incurred in this Court and in the district court.
DATED this 29th day of July, 2002.
WOOD CRAPO LLC

^
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Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
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